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Excess Worker Turnover and Fixed-Term Contracts: 
Causal Evidence in a Two-Tier System
* 
 
Portuguese firms engage in intense reallocation, most employers simultaneously hire and 
separate from workers, resulting in high excess worker turnover flows. These flows are 
constrained by the employment protection gap between open-ended and fixed-term 
contracts. We explore a reform that increased the employment protection of open-ended 
contracts and generated a quasi-experiment. The causal evidence points to an increase in 
the share and in the excess turnover of fixed-term contracts in treated firms. The excess 
turnover of open-ended contracts remained unchanged. This result is consistent with a high 
degree of substitution between open-ended and fixed-term contracts. At the firm level, we 
also show that excess turnover is quite heterogeneous and quantify its association with firm, 
match, and worker characteristics. 
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responsibility. 1 Introduction
The simultaneity of separations and hirings at the rm level generates worker turnover in
excess of what would be strictly necessary for a rm to achieve a given employment level.
The theoretical basis for the existence of a continuous ow of hirings and separations in
the same rm can be found in Jovanovic (1979), Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) or Gibbons
and Katz (1991). The existence of shocks (uncertainty) to the allocation of labor is the
main explanation for the simultaneous occurrence of hirings and separations.
This paper contributes to the characterization of excess worker turnover at the rm
level within a two-tier system, an institutional framework in which protected open-ended
contracts coexist with more exible xed-term arrangements. In 2004, a reform of the labor
code increased the protection of open-ended employment for rms with 11 to 20 workers,
but left it unchanged for all other rms. We explore this change as a quasi-experiment.
In the last decades, two-tier reforms characterized the development of labor market
regulations in most European countries. Rather than exing the rules governing open-
ended contracts, labor market reforms increased the protection gap between incumbents
(on open-ended contracts) and entry jobs (mostly on xed-term contracts).
The short nature of xed-term matches can be associated with worker turnover at the
rm level. In Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz (1999) and Boeri (2010) matching models,
xed-term contracts play an important role in the initial stages of the matching process.
The xed-term contract is interpreted as an investment that, if successful, may be con-
verted into an open-ended contract. A larger protection gap between open-ended and
xed-term contracts should be associated with a larger share of xed-term contracts in
employment and with a smaller conversion rate of xed-term to open-ended contracts.
This implies that the number of workers hired until a vacancy is lled permanently will
be larger, resulting in higher turnover for xed-term contracts and lower job destruction
for open-ended contracts.
We use two administrative matched employee-employer datasets covering all private
sector jobs and show that worker ow rates in the Portuguese labor market largely exceed
the rates of job creation and destruction. The ratio of the worker hiring and job creation
rates equals 2 { for every job created in the economy there are two hirings; the same gure
2is obtained for the ratio between worker separation and job destruction rates. Davis,
Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006) report similar ratios for the U.S., as does Bassanini
(2010) for a large number of OECD countries.
The data showed, however, a strong heterogeneity in the pattern of workers rotation
across rm size. Furthermore, hirings and separations move symmetrically during periods
of expansion and contraction of employment. Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2001) obtain akin
results for a census of Maryland rms. We then ask: How is this employment variability
achieved in Portuguese rms?
In order to answer this question, we resorted to the legislative reform that set more
stringent requirements for fair dismissals of open-ended contracts for a subset of rms.
This allowed us to identify causal relationships between the employment protection gap of
open-ended and xed-term contracts and two important labor market indicators: the com-
position of employment and the level of excess worker turnover. Treated rms increased the
share of xed-term contracts (1.7 percentage points), while overall excess worker turnover
remained unchanged. More interestingly in the context of two-tier reforms, we obtained
a signicant increase in excess turnover of xed-term contracts in treated rms (1.3 per-
centage points), whereas excess turnover for open-ended workers remained unchanged.
This can be interpreted as a sign of a high substitution degree between open-ended and
xed-term positions in Portuguese rms, a result also found by Cappellari, Dell'Aringa
and Leonardi (2011) for Italy.
In the spirit of Burgess et al. (2001), we also quantied the contribution of several
worker, rm, and match characteristics to the excess worker turnover at the rm level.
The results revealed that xed-term contracts are positively associated with excess worker
turnover. The substitution eect suggested in the quasi-experimental setting was con-
rmed in this analysis; a larger share of xed-term contracts crowded-out turnover among
open-ended contracts, and directed it towards xed-term contracts.
Overall, our analysis contributes to the growing literature on two-tier labor markets
(Boeri 2010), providing causal evidence of the role played by the interplay between open-
ended and exible contracts on the ability of rms to achieve a desired level of excess
worker turnover.
32 Two-tier labor market: Reform and theory
Portugal's labor market is an extreme case of a two-tier system. In this section, we provide
an overview of its characteristics, along with a description of a reform that provides a quasi-
experimental setting to analyze the impact of an increase in the protection gap between
open-ended and xed-term contracts. We describe theoretical models that may help us
understand the functioning of two-tier labor markets.
2.1 The 2004 reform: more employment protection for open-ended con-
tracts
The Portuguese labor market evolved to a two-tier system in which dierent types of
contracts are oered concurrently: xed-term and open-ended contracts. According to
the OECD employment protection legislation indicator, Portugal has one of the largest
protection gaps between these two type of contracts. Furthermore, there is a widespread
usage of xed-term contracts { in 2002, they represented almost 20% of total salaried
employment, increasing to more than 27% in 2008. These features make of Portugal one
of the most extreme cases of two-tier systems in Europe, well suited to analyze and quantify
the relationship between excess worker turnover and the employment protection gap.
Fixed-term contracts were rst introduced in 1976 and revised several times since.
They are a legal instrument for all levels of qualications and most tasks. The severance
payment of open-ended contracts is slightly larger than for xed-term contracts.1 But the
largest dierence between the two contracts resides in the procedural costs to terminate a
match. These are absent at the expiration of xed-term contracts, but are rather signicant
for permanent positions. In 2003, the reform of the labor code increased even further these
procedural costs for a subset of rms (Decreto-Lei 99/2003).
Beginning in 2004, to justify a fair dismissal, rms with 11 to 20 workers are obliged to a
written procedure involving the workers council and, if the worker is an union delegate, the
union itself. Then, the worker has 10 business days to reply to the rm's notication and
may require further diligences, including interviewing witnesses indicated by the worker.
1At the expiration of a xed-term contract, the worker receives a severance payment equal to 3 days for
each month of employment (2 days if the employment relationship lasted less than 1 year). For permanent
contracts the severance payment is set in court, between 15 and 45 days for each year of seniority (often
30 days), with a minimum of 90 days.
4The rm may dismiss these requests, but must provide written justication. Upon these
diligences, the rm reaches a nal decision and communicates it to the workers council
(and union). Altogether, these procedures extend the process substantially (typically 2
months), involves legal counselors and administrative costs. To some extent this reform
undid the 1989 reform analyzed in Martins (2009).
Before the reform, these rms did not have to comply with these additional proce-
dures, beneting from a simpler and less costly process to dismiss workers. After the
reform, all rms with more than 10 workers share the same procedural costs and the less
costly procedures are available only for rms with 10 or less workers. This generated a
quasi-experiment where the protection gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts
widened for a subset of rms, but remained the same for other rms.
We explore this quasi-experiment to obtain causal evidence of the impact of employ-
ment protection legislation on the composition of employment and the level of excess
worker turnover. Firms with 11 to 20 workers constitute the treatment group; those not
aected by the reform, rms with 21 to 100 workers constitute the control group. The
restriction in the maximum size of rms in the control group, follows among others Kugler
and Pica (2008) and Martins (2009). We test extensively the sensitivity of our results to
the specic choice of the treatment and control groups.
2.2 The theoretical framework of two-tier systems
Excess worker turnover can be seen as resulting from the reevaluation of job match quality.
This process of mobility is the result of an investment decision where the match is an
\experience good"; as in Jovanovic (1979), the only way to determine its quality is to
form the match and \experience it". As the rm and the worker learn about the match
quality, they assess the costs and benets of changing labor market partner. If either side
decides to change partner, but not to change labor market state (the worker supplies labor;
the rm keeps the same employment level), they will generate excess worker turnover.
These decisions vary from rm to rm, as a result of the degree of heterogeneity of rms'
personnel policies and the evolution of the match value. For instance, some rms have
higher turnover costs; some skills are easier to observe and, therefore, to evaluate prior to
the match formation; and the frequency of technological changes varies across rms. All
5these factors aect the optimal degree of excess worker turnover, which in some cases may
lead several rms to opt for a zero excess worker turnover.
The perception in several developed countries of a strong protection of open-ended
contracts lead to the introduction of reforms aimed at increasing exibility in the labor
market. As surveyed in Boeri (2010), the most common reform was the introduction of
xed-term contracts, with lower dismissal costs (both procedural and nancial). These
reforms left unchanged the regulation of open-ended contracts, which generated two-tier
systems and aected the level and composition of job and worker ows.
The theoretical analysis of two-tier systems goes back to the work of Abowd et al.
(1999), who in turn extend the work of Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) to include the forces
that may aect the mobility of workers between jobs, featuring a specic role for xed-
term contracts. In their model, the worker is hired initially under a xed-term contract,
which is interpreted as a period of investment required to generate a high-productivity
job. The worker mobility induced by xed-term contracts reects the uncertainty in the
success of the initial match-specic investment. The number of xed-term appointments
required to generate a productive job is uncertain. It may involve the hiring and separation
from several workers before a permanent vacancy is lled. However optimal, this chain of
matches generates excess worker turnover at the rm level.
A similar approach is followed by Boeri (2010). As in Abowd et al. (1999), all entry-
level jobs are xed-term contracts and the rate of conversion into open-ended contracts
depends on the protection gap between the two contract types. Boeri (2010) nds that
an increase in the employment protection for incumbents (under open-ended contracts)
decreases the conversion of temporary jobs into permanent ones. This implies an increase
in the share of xed-term contracts for entry-level jobs and in their turnover rates. This
increase in the protection gap will also imply a reduction in the job loss rate of open-
ended contracts, but will have an ambiguous impact on their excess worker turnover, as
accessions into permanent jobs are also reduced. More recently, Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado
and Le Barbanchon (2010) present a related approach and study the French and Spanish
labor markets. They show that a larger protection gap lead to a more frequent destruction
of matches under xed-term contract, with similar impacts on excess worker turnover.
The change in excess worker turnover for each type of contract in response to an
6increase in the employment protection of open-ended contracts rests on the assumption of
substitutability between them. If they are poor substitutes, then excess worker turnover
of xed-term contracts may not change. Note that the models above assume that the two
types of contracts are perfect substitutes in production.
In the context of the quasi-experiment, these models provide a guide to interpret the
causal relationships between excess worker turnover and the employment protection gap.
The key issue in two-tier labor markets in which dierent contracts are oered concurrently
(and are perfect substitutes) is not the optimal level of excess worker turnover at the rm
level, but the role played by each type of contract in the ability of rms to reach their
desired level of workers rotation. Our paper quanties how much the share of xed-term
contracts contributes to the variation in excess worker turnover at the rm level. In
doing so, we explore the institutional setting of the Portuguese labor market that gives a
preeminent role to xed-term contracts.
3 Aggregate job, worker, and excess worker turnover ows
We start our analysis by computing aggregate measures of job and worker ows in the
Portuguese economy and compare them with stylized facts known for other economies.
We follow Abowd et al. (1999) and explore possible sources of heterogeneity at the rm
level arising from dierences in size and type of employment growth.
3.1 Data
The analysis of the process of job and workers ows in the Portuguese economy is based on
two administrative statistical sources. This is particularly useful, not only because it allows
for a cross-validation of the results, but mainly because the two datasets complement each
other in important aspects.
Social Security Records (SSR) database
The SSR database is a matched employer-employee census of private and public sector em-
ployment (excluding only rms with individual pension funds and civil servants). Social
security data have been increasingly used in labor market studies. These studies include
7issues related with mobility and the wage determination process (e.g. Lalive 2008, Dust-
mann, Ludsteck and Sch onberg 2009). The nature of the information, self-declared wages
subject to mandatory contributions to the Portuguese Social Security system, makes the
SSR a unique source of information on labor market developments. The data set registers,
not only wages, but all social and unemployment related nancial transfers paid to workers
by the Social Security system.
The SSR data cover the period from January 2000 to December 2009. The dataset
includes all employer-employee pairs for which there is at least one month of wages declared
to the Social Security. For each of these pairs, the dataset has the information on the rst
and last month in which there are wage payments.
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) database
The QP is an administrative dataset collected on an annual basis (reported to the month
of October of each year). Its coverage is similar to the SSR (we are able to cross-validate
around 98% of all the employer-employee matches in the two datasets). The QP is a
source of information of great importance in the microeconomic analysis of employment
in Portugal and has been extensively used (for a detailed description of the dataset, see
Cabral and Mata (2003)).
The data are available since 1982 (with the exception of 1990 and 2001), but we
restrict the analysis to the 2002 { 2008 period because information on the type of contract
is available only since 2002.
3.2 Job and Worker Flows Concepts
Our analysis of labor market ows is based on the standard denitions laid down in
Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). For a given rm, the year-to-year job creation and














where Xt is the number of employees in (October of) year t.
The hirings in year t, Ht, are dened as the number of workers in a rm at time t that
8were not employed in that rm at t   1. The separations in year t, St, are equal to the









The rate of net employment change (NEC) is equal to the dierence between the hiring
and separation rates, NECt = HRt  SRt. The rate of excess worker turnover is given by
EWTt = HRt + SRt   jNECtj. In the literature this concept is also known as churning
(Burgess, Lane and Stevens 2000).
Excess worker turnover is the key concept in this study. Intuitively, it corresponds to
worker ows in excess of those strictly necessary to achieve a given level of employment.
Notice that the excess worker turnover equals twice the separations for expanding rms;
twice the hirings for contracting rms; and equals hirings plus separations for rms with
stable employment.
We apply these conventional denitions to the groups of workers dened by contract
type. We considered as separations from open-ended contracts all workers who had an
open-ended contract in t   1, but are no longer with the rm in year t; similarly, hirings
are dened as all workers with an open-ended contract in t who were not in the rm in
year t   1. The rate of excess worker turnover for open-ended contracts is obtained by
dividing these ows by the average number of open-ended contracts in the rm in the two
periods.
The same computation is made with respect to xed-term contracts. One note must
be made, however, since some xed-term contracts may be converted into open-ended
contracts. We do not consider these conversions neither as separations from xed-term
contracts, nor as hirings into open-ended contracts. Thus, hirings and separations imply
always a ow in or out of the rm, respectively.
Note that total excess worker turnover is not equal to the sum of excess worker turnover
by contract type. A simple example makes this point clear. Consider a rm with 50
workers that decides to replace 10 open-ended jobs with 10 workers under xed-term
contracts. This will generate excess worker turnover because the rm engages in hirings
9and separations simultaneously. In particular, it results in an excess turnover rate of 0.4.
However, for each type of contract the turnover is zero. This results from the fact that the
increase in level of xed-term contracts equals the number of hirings and the reduction in
open-ended contracts equals the number of separations.
3.3 Aggregate ows
Table 1 shows the rates of job creation and destruction, as well as the rates of hirings and
separations of workers for all rms in the economy. We compute both annual and quarterly
rates, using Social Security data, between 2000 and 2009, and compare them with the U.S.
ows reported in Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger and Rucker (2010). In Portugal, during
this period, the average rate of annual job creation is 12.7% and the destruction rate is
11.9%. These gures are very close to the ones obtained from Quadros de Pessoal in
Blanchard and Portugal (2001) and more recently in Centeno, Machado and Novo (2008).
The process of creation and destruction of jobs is characterized by much larger ows of
entry and exit of workers. In aggregate terms, annual worker ows are around twice the
number of job ows (25%, on average).
[TABLE 1 (see page 25)]
The level of job and worker ows diers substantially according to the frequency with
which these ows are observed; higher-frequency quarterly data capture ows that are left
unidentied in annual observations. On average in each quarter, expanding Portuguese
rms create 5 new jobs for every 100 existing jobs (and a similar number is destroyed).
This process of expansion and contraction of employment in rms is achieved through the
hiring and separation from 9 employees. The ratio between worker and job ows can be
used as a measure of excess worker turnover. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 1, these
ratios are close to 2; rms expanding one employment position hire two workers and rms
contracting one employment position separate from two workers.
We compare the ow rates of Portugal with those for the U.S. using data from the
Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for worker ows, and the Business
Employment Dynamics (BED) for job ows.2
2The comparison of job and worker ows across countries is hindered, among other things, by the
protocol used to collect the data (administrative data vs specic business surveys), the level of coverage
10Labor market ows in Portugal are smaller than in the U.S. both on annual and
quarterly terms. On average, for the period considered, the annual ows in Portugal are
90% of those for the U.S. and the quarterly ows are about two-thirds. More important, the
hiring-to-job creation and separation-to-job destruction ratios are equal in both countries
and in both data frequencies. This means that the cross-country dierences in job ows are
similar to the cross-country dierences in worker ows. Albk and Sorensen (1998) reports
similar ratios for Denmark using annual data from 1980 to 1990 for the manufacturing
sector and also Bassanini (2010) for a large number of OECD countries, using comparable
datasets.
Excess worker turnover and rm employment growth
The phenomenon of excess worker turnover is easier to analyze if the information is pre-
sented in a less aggregated way. Table 2 separates rms according to their type of em-
ployment growth in two consecutive periods. We consider three groups of rms: (i) with
net job creation; (ii) with net job destruction; and (iii) with zero net job creation, which
we refer to as stable employment. On average, for the overall economy, the employment
level in expanding rms is similar to the one in contracting rms, each representing about
41.5% of total employment. The remaining 17% of salaried workers are in rms that did
not change their employment level.
[TABLE 2 (see page 25)]
There is a symmetric behavior of expanding and contracting rms, revealed by their
dierent intensities of hirings and separations. Firms with expanding employment created,
on average, 20.6 jobs per 100 workers. This expansion of employment is supported on the
hiring of 36.4 workers and the separation from 15.8 workers (columns (1) and (2), bottom).
As a result, the excess worker turnover in expanding rms is 31.5% (column (3)). The
behavior of contracting rms is symmetric (columns (4)-(6)). To reduce their employment
(census vs. sample of specic parts of the population, for example large rms), and the sectoral composition
of each country employment. The BED data are based on a census of private sector establishments, and the
adjusted JOLTS data from Davis et al. (2010) approximates the rm demography in BED (note that the
original JOLTS data do not cover new rms, and the sample design does not allow for a treatment of exiting
rms). These adjustments make the U.S. ows more comparable with the ones obtained for Portugal using
Social Security data. We thank Jason Faberman for making available the comparable JOLTS data.
11level by 18.8 workers, they separate from 30.7 and hire 11.8 workers; the excess worker
turnover rate is close to 24%. These results are in line with the ones obtained for a census
of Maryland rms by Burgess et al. (2001).3
One interesting result is obtained for rms that have stable employment (columns
(7)-(9)). These rms have hiring and separation rates lower than the other two groups,
yet they still engage in substantial turnover; on average, they separate from 10% of their
workforce each year. Firms with stable employment level are not lethargic.
The magnitude and composition of job and worker ows is highly correlated with the
rm size (Davis et al. 1996). We analyze the relationship between job and worker ows
and the size of rms, as measured by the (average) number of workers. We highlight three
key facts from Table 2.
First, for expanding rms separation rates increase monotonically with rm size (col-
umn (2)), decreasing monotonically for contracting rms (column (5)), while hiring rates
have a less monotonic behavior (columns (1) and (4)). Secondly, regardless of the rm size,
the hiring rates of rms in expansion are always clearly above the hiring rates of rms in
contraction (columns (1) and (4)). But separation rates in the two types of rms converge
quite signicantly with rm size (they are virtually the same for those with more than 500
workers, columns (2) and (5)). This implies that large rms shrinking their employment
level rely on a reduction in entry and not on an increase in separations. This result is
consistent with the behavior reported in Abowd et al. (1999) in their sample of French
rms with 50 or more workers. Finally, excess worker turnover (columns (3), (6), and (9))
increases with rm size (except for stable rms). A good property for the rm size range
used in the quasi-experiment (10-100 workers) is that among these rms excess turnover is
similar. Choosing smaller or larger rms would result in less homogeneous groups; smaller
rms (< 10 workers) have lower turnover and larger rms (> 100 workers) clearly higher
churning.
3A more thorough analysis of this symmetric behavior would benet from distinguishing quits and
dismissals, which may dier by rm growth type. However, this is not feasible because in our data the two
types of separations are not identied.
124 Employment duration, labor market ows and xed-term
contracts
We have seen that hiring and separation decisions account, in similar ways, for the variabil-
ity of employment in Portuguese rms. We now ask how do rms achieve this variability
within the Portuguese two-tier system. The high numbers of ows and excessive worker
turnover do not mean that most workers rotate between jobs, as they are compatible
with the prevalence of long-term employment (Hall 1982, Ureta 1992). However, this re-
quires enough heterogeneity in hiring and separation rates across workers, which can be
accomplished by placing the burden of the high turnover on xed-term contracts.
Table 3 presents the share of workers that preserve the 2002 match in the following
years (from 2003 up to 2008), regardless of the number of years of tenure.4 The results
show that there is a stable core of employment in Portuguese rms { around 40% of the
workers are still employed by the same rm after six years (column 1). This gure is
slightly smaller than the ones reported by Burgess et al. (2000) for the U.S. (42.5% for
manufacturing and 47.3% for non-manufacturing). As expected, workers with a xed-term
contract in 2002 have a much smaller probability of remaining in the rm. In 2003, 40%
were still on a xed-term contract (column 2) and 14% had been converted to a open-ended
contract (column 3). In 2006, only one quarter were still in the same rm, the majority
with a permanent job, 19%, but 6% remained under a xed-term contract.
[TABLE 3 (see page 26)]
These numbers hint at a great deal of turnover for xed-term contracts. The hetero-
geneity in hiring and separation rates by type of contract is conrmed in Table 4. The
share of xed-term contracts is larger in rms increasing employment (28.9% of employ-
ment) than in rms decreasing employment (20.5% of employment). However, xed-term
contracts are the most important port of entry into these two types of rms; 54% of all
accessions in expanding rms and 53% for rms reducing their employment level. Around
40% of all exits come from separation of workers under xed-term contracts; this share is
larger for expanding rms, around 47%, than for shrinking rms, where only 37% of all
4These results are based on the QP, the only data source with information on the type of contract.
13exits are from workers under xed-term contracts.
[TABLE 4 (see page 26)]
Table 4 also shows that expanding rms rely more on hirings under xed-term con-
tract to expand their operations. Of a net growth rate of 21.5%, 12.7 percentage points
correspond to hirings on xed-term contracts (60% of net employment gains). Conversely,
contracting rms separate from a much larger share of permanent workers. Almost three
quarters of the net employment losses of 18.1% result from a reduction in the level of
permanent positions (13.1 percentage points).
5 Quasi-experimental evidence
In this section, we take advantage of the legislative reform described in Section 2.1 to gather
quasi-experimental evidence. The increase in the degree of employment protection that
aected open-ended contracts in a subset of rms is explored to capture the dierentiated
impact on excess worker turnover by type of contract { open-ended and xed-term, as well
as on the share of xed-term contracts.
Due to the focus on the relationship between worker turnover and the type of labor
contracts, the analysis carried out is based exclusively on Quadros de Pessoal, which is the
only database with information on the type of contract. The comprehensive nature of the
data, covering more than 2 million salaried workers in over 300 thousand rms each year,
works to our advantage in identifying the impact of the reform.
Recall that the reform increased the legal requirements needed to justify a fair dis-
missal for open-ended contracts and applied only to rms with 11 to 20 workers; similar
requirements were already in place in 2004 for rms with more than 20 workers. Therefore,
these larger rms were not aected by this new legislation. Each period, we consider as
treatment units the rms with 11 to 20 workers and as control units rms with 21 to 100
workers. Later, we assess the sensitivity of the results to changes in the denition of the
treatment and control groups.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the sample of treatment and control rms, a
total of 45,876 rms, resulting in an unbalanced panel with 181,131 observations (year 
14rm pairs). These rms employed each year an average of 610 thousand workers. In the
before period, which corresponds to 2003, there were 14,170 treatment observations and
11,877 control observations. In the after period, 2004 to 2008, there were 81,439 treatment
observations and 73,645 control observations. The average share of xed-term contracts
was 28.2%. Firms churned, on average, 24.6% of their workforce in annual terms. The
churning of xed-term workers was 34.7%, clearly larger than the churning of workers on
open-ended contracts, 12.4%.
[TABLE 5 (see page 27)]
5.1 Dierence-in-dierences: More stringent employment protection
We identify the causal average treatment eect on the treated based on a standard
dierence-in-dierences model:
yit =  1Treatit +  2Afterit +  3Afterit  Treatit + Xit + "it; (1)
where yit is either the share of xed-term contracts or the level of excess worker turnover
in rm i in period t. Afterit is a dummy variable for the period after 2003. The treatment
indicator, Treatit, is dened for each period t, and equals 1 for the treatment group and
0 for the control group. Consequently, the interaction term, Afterit  Treatit, identies
the impact of the policy change. A set of rm, match, and worker characteristics, such
as, the rm size, the proportion of xed-term contracts, the average (log) base wage, the
educational level and average age of the rm's workforce are included in Xit; a compre-
hensive list of the variables used is presented in the note to Table 6. We opt to estimate
this equation with the xed-eects estimator, for which it is assumed that the error term
"it = i + uit, where the unobserved component i is orthogonal to Xit and uit is the
idiosyncratic error.
[TABLE 6 (see page 28)]
We start by studying the impact that a more stringent employment protection legisla-
tion had on the share of xed-term contracts. Churning is a natural process that involves
simultaneous hirings and separations, which are more costly for workers in open-ended
15contracts. Faced with an increase in the ring costs of these contracts, rms may have
opted for increasing the share of xed-term contracts. We test this hypothesis in the
quasi-experimental setting, expecting  3 to be positive. Column (1) of Table 6 reports the
average treatment eect on the share of xed-term contracts for the treated rms. The
new legislation caused treated rms to increase by 1.6 percentage points their usage of
xed-term contracts.
In the mind of the legislator may have only been the intention of reducing churning
by making it more expensive to justify fair dismissals. We have, however, seen that rms
switched towards xed-term contracts. But did they also used this type of contract to
churn workers? In columns (2) and (3), we test how the new legislation aected the rate
of excess worker turnover by type of contract. Churning among workers on xed-term
contracts in treated rms increased 1.3 percentage points, while no signicant impact is
observed among open-ended contracts (if anything, a reduction). These results are aligned
with the models' predictions and corroborate the shift towards an extended usage of xed-
term contracts and suggest that there is a strong substitution between the two type of
workers. This substitutability is in line with the results found in Cappellari et al. (2011)
for Italian rms, providing additional support for such assumption in the model of Boeri
(2010).
Finally, in column (4), we report the results of the dierence-in-dierences estimation
for total excess worker turnover. The estimate indicates that the more stringent dismissals
regulation did not change the level of excess worker turnover for treated rms. Although
Martins (2009) did not study turnover, he also did not nd any impact on total job and
worker ows of a reduction in employment protection for Portuguese rms.
5.2 Robustness exercises
The denition of treatment and control units based on the size of the rm opens the
possibility for rms to self-select into the treatment and control groups in response to
the policy. The use of the xed eects estimator should go a long way to obviate issues
of endogeneity in the regressors (Lee 2005). Nonetheless, in columns (1)-(6) of Table 7,
we redene the treatment and control groups following, among others, Kugler and Pica
(2008) and Martins (2009). First, we set the treatment status in the before period and
16keep it unchanged in the after period, even if rms changed size (columns (1)-(3)). Second,
we consider only rms that never changed status during the entire observation window
(columns (4)-(6)).
[TABLE 7 (see page 29)]
Both denitions are fraught with shortcomings arising from the fact that they are
selected samples of the targeted population. However, our point estimates of the causal
eect are robust to these new denitions. In the case of the impact on the share of xed-
term contracts, the new estimates suggest a slightly larger impact with a treatment eect
on the treated of around 2 percentage points (columns (1) and (4)), which compare with
the previous point estimate of 1.6 percentage points. In terms of excess worker turnover,
we still obtain only signicant impacts on the turnover of xed-term contracts. In column
(2), where the treatment status is set in the before period, the point estimate is the same
as initially, 1.3 percentage points. In column (5), for the sample with rms that have the
same treatment status in the entire period, the impact stands at 2.1 percentage points.
An additional concern arises from the behavior of rms close to the size thresholds,
as they may strategically choose a smaller size to minimize procedural ring costs. To
address this issue, we remove from the data rms clustered around each period's threshold
(columns (7)-(9)). In particular, in the before period, with a 20-worker threshold, rms
with 18-25 workers are not considered and, in the after period, with a 10-worker threshold,
rms with 11 or 12 workers are excluded. Again, all point estimates are in the range
reported hitherto. Fixed-term contracts were more used, 1.8 percentage points, churning
of xed-term contracts increased 1.3 percentage points, and there is no treatment impact
on the turnover of open-ended contracts.
Finally, in columns (10)-(12), we recover the original denition of the treatment group
and extended the control group by including rms with 5 to 10 workers. Qualitatively
the results are the same: increases in the share of xed-term contracts and in the rate
of excess turnover among such contracts and a reduction in the turnover of open-ended
contracts. Quantitatively, we have a lower impact on the share of xed-term contracts,
0.6 percentage points, a similar increase in xed-term contracts churning, 1.2 percentage
points, but we now have a statistically signicant reduction in the churning of open-ended
17contracts, -0.5 percentage points.
Taken together, these results allow us to draw some conclusions on the nature of the
Portuguese two-tier labor market. Increasing the ring costs of open-ended contracts
caused rms to optimally increase the share of workers on xed-term contracts (0.6 to
2.1 percentage points); rms re-optimized their personnel policies against future dismissal
costs due to the shielded nature of incumbents under open-ended contracts. We also saw
an increase in churning among xed-term contracts (1.2 to 2.1 percentage points), while
the additional protection shielded open-ended contracts from churning (negative, but non-
signicant). The distinct impacts on the two types of contracts is suggestive of a strong
substitutability among workers under dierent contracts. Increasing the protection gap
between contract types in a two-tier system caused, as predicted theoretically, an increase
in the adjustment burden shared by those on the more exible contracts.
5.3 Falsication
The dierence-in-dierences exercise has shown a strong resilience to the denition of
the treatment and control rms. Nonetheless, we test the robustness of the results by
considering a simple falsication exercise.
We construct a placebo treatment group with rms sized 1 to 4 workers, which were
not used in the estimation process and use as control group rms with 5 to 10 workers.
All these rms were not aected by the new legislation. In a falsication exercise, there
should be no dierence in outcomes attributable to the treatment. The results in columns
(13) to (15) of Table 7 conrm this; the coecients on the After  Treat variable are all
statistically non-signicant. Overall, the falsication exercise increase the condence in
the identication of the treatment eect.
6 Regression analysis
We have already presented the main characteristics of the Portuguese labor market ows
and causal evidence on the relationship between ring costs of open-ended contracts in a
two-tier system and the level of excess worker turnover. Now, we quantify the relationship
between the rate of excess worker turnover and a set of covariates capturing rm, match,
18and worker characteristics. This type of quantication is still missing by large in the
literature. Therefore, it shall contribute to a better understanding of worker turnover in
view of particular labor market characteristics. We will explore the panel of rms with 5
or more workers and estimate rm xed-eects models (Table 8).5
[TABLE 8 (see page 30)]
In the dichotomy of two-tier labor markets, with a high substitutability between con-
tract types, the most interesting association is the one established between (the share of)
xed-term contracts and the level of excess worker turnover. Our regression setup shows
that xed-term contracts have distinct impacts on the rates of excess worker turnover
computed by contract type. While an increase of 10 percentage points (about one-third
standard deviation) in xed-term contracts is associated with an increase of 2.69 percent-
age points in the turnover of workers on xed-term contracts, the same increase in the
share of xed-term contracts leads to a decrease of 1.89 percentage points in the turnover
of workers on open-ended contracts. Again, we observe a substitutability of the two type
of workers, which we had already hinted at in the quasi-experimental setting. Although
the parts do not add up to the whole, in column (3), we see that more workers on xed-
term contracts result in higher levels of overall excess worker turnover. An increase of
10 percentage points in the share of xed-term contracts is associated with a short-term
increase in excess worker turnover of 0.72 percentage points. It may be hard to access
the magnitude of this impact by itself, but the impact of other covariates on the level of
turnover may help us grasp how signicant this impact is.
Higher average wages, as far as they reect higher productivity and better matches
between workers and rms, should be associated with lower turnover (Jovanovic 1979).
Among Portuguese rms, those with higher average wages have lower turnover. For in-
stance, with everything else the same, a rm with average wages 10 percentage points
5In the panel, around one third of the observations (pairs yearrm) have zero excess worker turnover.
From an econometric point of view, this mass point might be more appropriately addressed with tobit
models. In a previous version of the paper, we also estimated tobit models. The need to retrieve the
marginal eect on the expected value of the observed variable (as opposed to the latent variable) requires a
parametric estimation method. Unfortunately, no such method is available for xed-eects, only random-
eects; the xed eects estimator developed in Honor e (1993) is fully non-parametric, limiting its usefulness
in our setting. However, because there are no substantive quantitative dierences between the random-
eects tobit model and the standard linear xed-eects, we will follow the literature (Burgess et al. 2001)
and stick with the latter, which has better properties to handle obvious concerns with the endogeneity of
some of the regressors.
19higher (about a quarter standard deviation) will have a level of total turnover 0.7 per-
centage points lower; a comparable magnitude in total excess turnover to decreasing by
10 percentage points the share of xed-term contracts. Higher wages are more important
to contain excess turnover among workers on xed-term contracts than on open-ended
contracts (columns (1) and (2)).
Following a similar rational, if tasks associated with blue-collar matches require less-
specic human capital or are more substitutable, one could expect a higher prevalence
of such matches to be associated with higher churning. This hypothesis is conrmed in
the data. An increase in the proportion of blue-collar matches results in slightly higher
turnover, but not for open-ended contracts. The share of high-schoolers and the share
of workers with 9 or less years of schooling aect almost identically the level of worker
turnover. However, a higher share of college graduates is associated with higher levels of
excess worker turnover.
While both females and immigrants tend to be associated with measures of discrimi-
nation, which could be reected in higher rates of excess turnover, in our data, we do not
nd signicant evidence of such an association. A higher share of female workers results
in lower turnover. A higher share of foreigner workers reduces excess turnover among
open-ended contracts, but increases among xed-term contracts.
Two key characteristics of rms are highly correlated with the magnitude of job and
worker ows: size and age (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda 2010). In terms of size,
larger rms are the ones that \experiment" workers the most. Even though they do not
exhibit high rates of expansion or contraction (Table 2), which could be attributed to the
fact that they are closer to their steady state, these rms engage in more excess worker
turnover than smaller rms.
In terms of rm age, there is a dichotomy of excess turnover by contract type. Turnover
among xed-term contracts seems to occur regardless of the rm age; none of the age
dummy coecients is statistically signicant. However, that is not the case for open-
ended contracts. In this case, turnover is the highest for 2-year-old rms, decreasing
monotonically until age 6 and remains stable onwards. Overall, rm age is associated with
higher turnover for rms aged 4 or less years.
20Employment growth { expansion, contraction, or stability { may also inuence excess
turnover. Admittedly, rms in contraction may engage in policies based primarily on
separations, which could result in low rates of excess turnover; on the other hand, rms
increasing their employment level may have to engage in more trial and error, leading to
higher turnover; and rms with stable employment may be the ones with the largest degree
of churning as, by denition, all worker separations and accessions count towards excess
turnover. The dummy variables at the bottom of Table 8 answer this question. Indeed,
rms in contraction have the lowest level of excess turnover among the three types of
employment growth. Firms expanding their workforce have slightly lower levels of excess
turnover than rms with stable levels of employment, but not for open-ended contracts.
This suggest that a substantial part of the trial and error in expansion periods requires
replacing a large fraction of open-ended contracts.
Overall, the associations of rm, worker, and match characteristics with total excess
worker turnover are in line with results in the empirical job search literature (Topel and
Ward 1992, Burgess et al. 2001, Haltiwanger et al. 2010). Our results on the excess turnover
by contract type showed interesting dierences, which adhere to theoretical explanations,
but that were not yet explored in the empirical literature of worker ows.
7 Conclusions
The literature on job and worker ows has established a set of stylized facts common across
labor markets. Most notably, lling a vacancy requires the hiring and separation of more
than one worker. Our analysis of labor market ows in the Portuguese economy adheres
to these stylized facts. The personnel policies of Portuguese rms, however conditioned
by the perceived rigid labor code, are conducive to an intense reallocation of workers.
Abowd et al. (1999), Boeri (2010), and Bentolila et al. (2010) highlight the role of
xed-term contracts, in two-tier systems, as an instrument of adjustment in the matching
process. Motivated by these theoretical frameworks and the sustained increase in the share
of xed-term contracts registered in the Portuguese economy, we studied in greater detail
the determinants of excess worker turnover.
We tested the predictions of the models in a quasi-experimental setting. We showed
21that a more stringent protection of workers on open-ended contracts caused an increase
in the reliance on xed-term contracts by treated rms to achieve their desired level of
worker turnover. In this context, we also showed that the same reform caused an increase
in churning among workers on xed-term contracts. Both results pointed to the substi-
tutability of workers on the two type of contracts and the increased burden of adjustment
placed on the more exible contracts.
The political economy debate on the reduction of the employment protection gap
through the creation of a unique contract, as discussed in Blanchard and Tirole (2008),
should not focus on the reduction of excess worker turnover. After all, as motivated by
several search models, the stochastic nature of the matching process leads necessarily to a
desirable trial process. Our research showed that the virtue of the unique contract would
be to spread more uniformly the adjustment costs across all workers, without hindering
the formation of long-term employment relationships
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24Tables
Table 1: Job and worker ows in Portugal and the United States
Job Job Hiring/ Separation/
Creation Hiring Destruction Separation JC JD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual
Portugal (2001-2009) 12.7 25.2 11.9 24.5 2.0 2.1
Portugal (2001-2006) 12.8 25.4 12.0 24.7 2.0 2.1
USA (2001-2006) 14.6 28.5 13.7 28.0 2.0 2.0
Ratio PT/USA (2001-2006) 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88
Quarterly
Portugal (2001:Q1-2009:Q4) 5.0 9.2 4.9 9.0 1.8 1.8
Portugal (2001:Q1-2006:Q4) 5.2 9.4 5.0 9.2 1.8 1.8
USA (2001:Q1-2006:Q4) 7.9 14.9 7.6 14.8 1.9 1.9
Ratio PT/USA (2001:Q1-2006:Q4) 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.62
Sources: Portugal: Social Security. U.S.: The job ows are based on BED, covering all private establishments
(Davis et al. 2006). The quarterly data cover the 1990:2-2005:1 period; the annual data cover 1998-2002. The
workers ows are based on JOLTS with the adjustments introduced in Davis et al. (2010) to approximate the
rm demography based on the BED.
Table 2: Average worker ows rates by rm size, 2001-2009
Firms with
Net job creation Net job destruction Stable employment
Firm size Hiring Separation Turnover Hiring Separation Turnover Hiring Separation Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
[1;4] 62.1 10.1 20.1 8.7 60.7 17.4 8.3 8.3 16.6
[5;9] 43.6 12.3 24.7 10.4 40.7 20.7 10.5 10.5 21.0
[10;49] 36.0 14.9 29.9 12.1 31.4 24.2 11.5 11.5 23.0
[50;99] 30.6 14.4 28.8 11.3 25.9 22.5 11.3 11.3 22.6
[100;249] 29.4 14.3 28.6 10.5 24.0 20.9 10.5 10.5 20.9
[250;499] 31.9 16.3 32.6 12.1 24.9 32.6 9.7 9.7 19.4
+500 35.5 21.8 43.5 14.1 24.8 28.3 11.1 11.1 22.2
Total 36.4 15.8 31.5 11.8 30.7 23.6 9.8 9.8 19.6
Employment 1,224,738 1,174,261 489,639
Source: Social Security, 2001-2009. The values reported are the 2001-2009 averages. The rates are computed by
comparing the employment in the months of October of two consecutive years. Firm size is proxied by the employment
size.
25Table 3: Duration of matches by contract type
Probability holding the Fixed-term contract in 2002
same job as in 2002 Still xed-term Open-ended contract
(1) (2) (3)
2003 70.3 41.4 14.1
2004 58.3 22.3 19.6
2005 53.2 13.8 22.9
2006 46.7 9.7 22.0
2007 42.1 7.5 20.4
2008 38.1 5.8 19.0
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2008.
Notes: (1) Probability that an individual has the same employer in 2003,
2004, ..., 2008 that (s)he had in 2002. (2) Probability that an individual
who had a xed-term contract in 2002 still has a xed-term contract with
the same rm in 2003, 2004, ..., 2008. Note that, in 2003, xed-term
contracts could last up to 6 years. (3) Probability that an individual
who had a xed-term contract in 2002 has an open-ended contract with
the same rm in 2003, 2004, ..., 2008.
Table 4: Average worker ows by contract type, 2002-2008
Firms with
Net job creation Net job destruction Stable employment
(1) (2) (3)
Hiring rate 37.2 12.3 13.4
into open-ended 17.1 5.8 8.0
into xed-term 20.1 6.5 5.4
Separation rate 15.7 30.4 13.4
of open-ended 8.3 18.9 9.1
of xed-term 7.4 11.5 4.3
Net growth rate 21.5 -18.1 0.0
Contribution by
open-ended 8.8 -13.1 -1.1
xed-term 12.7 -5.0 1.1
Employment
open-ended 734,506 733,350 327,518
71.1% 79.5% 83.5%
xed-term 299,118 189,538 64,580
28.9% 20.5% 16.5%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2008.
26Table 5: Summary statistics: Firm-level data, 2003-2008
Variable (rm level) Mean Std.
Deviation
Fixed-term contracts per rm (in %) 28.2 27.93
Total excess worker turnover (in %) 24.6 25.71
Excess worker turnover by contract type:
Fixed-term contract 34.7 36.89
Open-ended contract 12.4 19.75
(Log) base wage 6.39 0.38
Blue-collar workers (in %) 36.3 25.19
Educational level, percentage of workers with:
9 or less years 69.9 27.31
10-12 years 19.7 18.97
College 10.4 16.56
Females (in %) 42.7 32.67
Immigrants (in %) 5.6 13.23
Firm size (average number of workers) 27.1 18.86
Firm age (in years) 21.2 25.47
Workforce average age (in years) 37.7 5.28
Workforce average tenure (in months) 79.8 57.08
Worker-rm matches (2003-2008) 4 903 529
Number of rms 45 876








Notes: Quadros de Pessoal, rm-level values 2003-2008. The \before" periods
corresponds to 2003 and the \after" period to 2004-2008. Each period, a treat-
ment rm has 11 to 20 workers and a control rm has 21 to 100 workers.




Dependent variable SFTC EFTC EOEC EWT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 0.445 -1.213 -1.422 -0.622
(0.139) (0.444) (0.190) (0.211)
Treat -1.180 -0.710 0.309 0.153
(0.232) (0.800) (0.319) (0.353)
After  Treat 1.629 1.306 -0.105 0.292
(0.182) (0.649) (0.250) (0.277)
Control variables { Yes. See notes {
Average of dependent variable 28.2 34.7 12.4 24.6
Number of rms 45 876 34 049 43 708 45 876
Number of observations
Before
Treatment 14 170 6 030 13 396 14 170
Control 11 877 7 138 11 236 11 877
After
Treatment 81 439 41 871 76 779 81 439
Control 73 645 52 729 69 844 73 645
Total 181 131 107 768 171 255 181 131
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses from rm xed-eects estimates.
SFTC stands for the share of xed-term contracts (in %); EFTC stands for
excess worker turnover among xed-term contracts (in %); EOEC stands
for excess worker turnover among open-ended contracts (in %); and EWT
stands for excess worker turnover (in %) among all workers. The \before"
periods corresponds to 2003 and the \after" period to 2004-2008. Each
period, a treatment rm has 11 to 20 workers and a control rm has 21 to
100 workers. The control variables included in the regressions are: (i) Log
base wage; (ii) Blue-collar workers (in %); (iii) Educational level, percent-
age of workers with: 9 or less years or college (omitted 10-12 years); (iv)
Females (in %); (v) Immigrants (in %) (vi); Log rm size (average number
of workers); (vii) Firm age (in years) dummies: 2;3;:::;10 years, 11-15
years, and 16-20 years (omitted 21 or more years); (viii) Workforce aver-
age age (in years) dummies: 15-30, 31-40, and 41-45 (omitted 46 or more
years); (ix) Workforce average tenure (in months) dummies: 1-36, 37-60,
and 61-120 (omitted 121 or more months); (x) Expanding and contracting
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 8: Rates of excess worker turnover: Fixed eects estimation
Fixed eects
Dependent variable EFTC EOEC EWT
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed-term contracts (%) 0.269 -0.189 0.072
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Average (log) base wage -10.481 -1.988 -6.671
(1.126) (0.461) (0.506)
Blue collar (%) 0.056 0.003 0.012
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Educational shares (%):
9 or less years 0.035 0.004 0.019
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007)
College or more 0.152 0.051 0.081
(0.026) (0.011) (0.012)
Female (%) -0.079 -0.024 -0.041
(0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
Immigrants (%) 0.046 -0.024 0.028
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Firm size (log) 23.315 7.095 6.850
(1.640) (0.722) (0.789)
Firm size (log) squared -1.566 -0.531 -0.053
(0.237) (0.114) (0.125)
Firm age (in years):
2 2.094 3.353 2.617
(1.745) (0.739) (0.809)
3 1.719 2.281 3.165
(1.576) (0.665) (0.735)
4 -0.434 1.866 1.517
(1.482) (0.628) (0.696)
5 -0.832 1.140 0.204
(1.395) (0.589) (0.656)
6 -1.555 0.988 0.361
(1.307) (0.551) (0.615)
7 -1.828 0.708 0.413
(1.223) (0.516) (0.576)
8 -1.101 0.545 0.349
(1.146) (0.483) (0.540)
9 -0.875 0.171 0.280
(1.075) (0.454) (0.508)
10 -0.744 0.729 0.309
(1.012) (0.428) (0.480)
[11;15] -0.885 0.352 0.022
(0.789) (0.328) (0.369)
[16;20] -0.147 0.142 -0.017
(0.548) (0.225) (0.253)
Expansion period -5.359 0.780 -1.081
(0.257) (0.103) (0.115)
Contraction period -0.723 -0.224 -1.782
(0.260) (0.102) (0.115)
Other covariates { Yes. See notes. {
Average excess turnover 32.3 12.2 23.1
Number of rms 48 702 66 455 69 738
Number of observations 162 767 297 346 315 104
Fraction of unobserved variance 0.46 0.44 0.51
Notes: Quadros de Pessoal, 2003-2008. Standard errors in paren-
theses from rm xed-eects estimates. EFTC stands for excess
worker turnover among xed-term contracts (in %); EOEC stands
for excess worker turnover among open-ended contracts (in %); and
EWT stands for excess worker turnover (in %) among all workers.
The regression models controlled additionally for: (i) Workforce
average age (in years) dummies: 15-30, 31-40, and 41-45 (omitted
46 or more years); (ii) Workforce average tenure (in months) dum-
mies: 1-36, 37-60, and 61-120 (omitted 121 or more months); and
(iii) Year dummies, 2004-2008 (omitted 2003).
30